Can Capacity Markets Be Designed by Democracy? by Blumsack, Seth et al.
Can Capacity Markets Be Designed by Democracy?  
 
Seth Blumsack 
Penn State University and 
Santa Fe Institute 
sab51@psu.edu 
Kyungjin Yoo 
Penn State University 
kxy151@psu.edu 
 
Nicholas Johnson 
Penn State University 
nhj105@psu.edu 
 
Abstract 
Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) are 
stakeholder-driven organizations where changes to 
rules or protocols go through a process of stakeholder 
approval. Based on interviews with PJM stakeholders, 
we observe the perception that the process is held up by 
specific coalitions. We use voting data from the PJM 
stakeholder process and a model of participatory 
decision-making to assess these stakeholder 
perceptions, integrated with a model of PJM’s capacity 
market to address how stakeholder-driven processes 
can design market constructs that promote reliability. 
We do observe a strong voting coalition by demand-side 
interests (electric distribution utilities and large direct-
access customers) but not by supply-side interests. In 
theory, this demand-side coalition can act in a pivotal 
manner to prevent any rule change from going forward. 
In the capacity market redesign case in practice, the 
pivotal or swing participants are more likely a smaller 
segment of financial market participants, such as hedge 
funds and banks. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) 
control the power grid serving more two-thirds of 
electricity customers in the U.S. and are critical 
organizations for ensuring reliable system operations 
and facilitating the integration of new technologies and 
market participants, including renewable power 
generation, energy storage and demand response. They 
are also supposed to be highly stakeholder-driven 
organizations, with rules and policies crafted through a 
highly participatory process. While the decisions that 
RTOs make have implications for industry, society and 
the environment, their decision processes have not been 
broadly studied. The environment in which rules and 
policies are made is important because market rules 
have a critical impact on the value of technology [1]. 
The preferences of different actors can impact the scale 
and scope of technology adoption [2,3], and can even 
affect system reliability [4]. 
The governance of RTOs and the behavior of RTOs 
as organizations has been raised a number of times in 
the literature (see [5-8] for examples). While questions 
have been raised about the outcomes of such 
stakeholder-driven decision processes, those processes 
have not, to date, been modeled in any systematic way. 
RTOs are tasked with ensuring reliable system 
operations, but there has been tension at times between 
this performance goal and the design goal for RTOs of 
being stakeholder-driven organizations. A recent set of 
semi-structured interviews with stakeholders active in 
the PJM Interconnection identified a number of sources 
of this tension [9,10]: 
1. A change in the nature of the decisions that the 
stakeholder process in PJM is asked to 
consider, from the more general and 
foundational to the more specific and 
technical; 
2. Growth in the number and nature of 
stakeholders has made informal coordination 
among stakeholders and stakeholder groups 
more difficult (effectively increasing 
transactions costs for the stakeholder process); 
3. A perception among PJM staff that the 
increased difficulty of stakeholder 
coordination may threaten reliability of the 
electricity system – viewed within PJM as the 
primary mission of the RTO. 
 
One outgrowth of these stakeholder perceptions has 
been to question the extent to which the rules for highly 
reliable system operations and planning to support 
reliable operations can be well-designed through a 
highly participatory process with so many competing 
interests. We investigate this question theoretically and 
empirically using a highly detailed data set from the 
PJM stakeholder process. Our work bridges some of the 
seminal literature from political science and political 
economy on the theory of voting systems [11 -16] and 
integrates models of the stakeholder process and market 
rules within PJM. We focus in particular on a series of 
votes taken in the PJM stakeholder process in 2011 on 
capacity market redesign.  
Section 2 of the paper describes the PJM stakeholder 
process and the voting structure used in the Members 
Committee, the construct on which we primarily focus 
in this work. Section 3 describes our voting data set from 
PJM and uses network analysis to identify strong 
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coalitions among end-user and supplier-side 
stakeholders in PJM. Section 4 describes the capacity 
market redesign alternatives, while Section 5 develops a 
theory of “passable proposals” that we use to 
parameterize capacity market designs and the payoffs to 
different stakeholders from those designs. In Section 6 
we use our passable proposal model to closely examine 
the spaces of capacity market redesign proposals that 
could or could not pass, and also examine the potential 
for different groups of stakeholders to behave pivotally 
to keep proposed capacity market redesigns from 
passing. Section 7 offers some concluding thoughts and 
directions for future research. 
 
2. Voting Structure in the PJM RTO  
 
The stakeholder process in PJM has a complex and 
hierarchical structure, as outlined in Figure 1 (the full 
structure is available in [17]). Issues and proposed 
changes to rules and protocols are often initiated in one 
of a large number of thematic or issue-specific 
subcommittees. If approved by the subcommittee, 
proposed rule changes then move to higher-level 
committees, the Markets and Reliability Committee 
(MRC) and the Members Committee (MC). Once 
passed by the MRC and MC, issues are typically 
forwarded to the PJM Board of Managers. Our focus in 
this paper is on voting behavior in the MC, for two 
reasons. First, detailed voting data is kept at the MC 
meetings for issues that do not clearly pass on a voice 
vote. Second, the MC has so-called “filing rights” in 
some areas of PJM governance, meaning that the MC 
can, in concept make filings directly with FERC, thus 
bypassing the PJM Board [18]. 
 
 
Figure 1: Structure of the PJM Stakeholder 
Process. Source: Adapted from [17]. 
 
 
Voting in the MC uses a procedure referred to by 
PJM as “sector-weighted voting.” Stakeholder 
participants in the MC self-identify with one of five 
sectors: Generation Owners (GO), Transmission 
Owners (TO), Electric Distribution Utilities (EDU), End 
Use Customers (EUC), or Other Suppliers (OS). The 
number of MC voters self-identifying in each sector, 
along with examples of specific companies in each 
sector, is shown in Table 1. Stakeholder participants are 
permitted to switch sectors, although we did not observe 
this happening very often in our data set. Stakeholders 
have some discretion to choose the sector with which 
they identify, particularly if they have business units in 
multiple sectors (such as a generation owner with a load-
serving obligation). The Other Suppliers sector is the 
largest and most diverse, consisting primarily of 
curtailment service providers, financial institutions, 
marketers and traders, and municipal/co-op utilities.  
 
Table 1: Composition of MC Voters. Source: 
PJM [19] 
 
Sector 
Number of 
Firms (%) Example Firms 
End Use 
Customers 6 (4%) 
Air Products, Proctor & 
Gamble 
Electric 
Distributors 14 (9%) 
PEPCO, Northern 
Virginia Electric 
Cooperative 
Generation 
Owners 22 (15%) Calpine, NRG 
Transmission 
Owners 5 (3%) Duquesne Light, PSEG 
Other Suppliers 105 (69%) 
Direct Energy (CSP), 
Citigroup Energy 
(Financial), EDF Trading 
(Marketer) 
 
Each of the five sectors is given equal weight in the 
PJM sector-weighted voting scheme. Within a given 
sector, each voting member is given equal weight. For 
each issue, MC participants can choose to vote yes or 
no, or can choose to abstain. A final voting score V is 
calculated as: 
 
(1) 𝑉 = #$%&%'(%(&%'(%)+,-.  , 
where djk is an indicator variable equal to one if voter 
j from sector k voted yes and zero if voter j from sector 
k voted no, nk is the total number of firms in sector k, 
and ak is the number of abstaining firms in sector k. A 
voting item passes if it attains a voting score of V³ 
3.335. This is equivalent to needing a supermajority of 
the five sectors for a vote to pass, and means that two 
sectors voting together (irrespective of the number of 
voters in the two sectors) could effectively act as a 
pivotal coalition, keeping any voting item from passing.  
Because of variation in the number of MC 
participants in each of the five sectors, an individual 
firm’s vote may contribute more in one sector than in 
other sectors. This phenomenon, and the MC voting 
system overall, is illustrated by the hypothetical voting 
item in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Sector-Weighted Voting Example 
Thematic)or)Issue/Specific)
Subcommittees)and)Working)Groups
Examples:
• Reliability/Standards/Subcommittee
• Demand/Response/Subcommittee
• Regional/Planning/Task/Force
• Markets)and)Reliability)
Committee)(MRC)
• Members)Committee)(MC)
Some/subcommittees/report/first/to/
the/MRC/and/then/the/MC/while/
others/report/to/the/MC/directly.
PJM)Board)of)
Managers
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In this example (which is not based on any actual 
data and is only for illustration), there are 94 MC voters, 
25 of which abstain. There are thus 10 counted voters 
from the TO sector, 15 voters from the GO sector, 20 
voters from the OS sector, 10 voters from the ED sector 
and 14 voters from the EUC sector. Of the counted 
voters, 80% from the TO sector voted in favor (8 out of 
10 voters that did not abstain), yielding a voting score 
from that sector of 0.8. As another example, 100% of 
the voters in the GO sector voted in favor, yielding a 
voting score of 1 for that sector. When the voting scores 
for all five sectors are added up, the overall voting score 
for this hypothetical issue is V = 3.347. Since this is 
higher than the threshold score of V = 3.335, this 
hypothetical voting issue would have passed. 
 
3. The Structure of Stakeholder Voting 
in PJM  
 
Detailed voting data from the PJM MC was obtained 
from the PJM web site covering the period 2011 to 2015 
[19]. Data prior to 2011 was not available for PJM. 
Voting data for the MRC and other subcommittees is not 
recorded in the same level of detail as voting data from 
the MC. Our data set consists of firm-level voting data 
for 26 votes cast on a wide variety of topics. We note 
that the MC votes on a large number of issues each year, 
and most pass or fail by voice vote. The 26 voting items 
in our data set thus represent a subset of votes taken 
during the time period 2011 – 2015 when an official 
vote count was requested by PJM or by a member of the 
MC. For each voting item, the data we obtained from 
PJM lists the name of the voting firm, how the firm 
voted (or if it abstained), their sectoral affiliation and 
primary line(s) of business (which, as discussed in Sec. 
2, may be different than their sectoral affiliation), some 
information on the size of their generation holdings, 
transmission holdings and load obligations in PJM (i.e., 
whether each firm identifies as a small or large generator 
and identifies as a net buyer or seller), and the name of 
the person representing that firm on each vote. 
To visualize the extent of and strength of coalitions 
across all 26 of the voting items, we structured the 
voting data as a weighted network. Each firm in the 
network was represented as a node, with branches 
representing votes. Two firms voting together on an 
individual voting item were thus linked by a branch in 
our network representation. Branches were weighted by 
the frequency with which firms voted together across 
our 26 voting items. 
A visualization of the voting network for firms 
voting against specific voting items is shown in Figure 
2 (i.e., Figure 2 shows the frequency with which firms 
vote together in opposition to certain issues – the 
frequency with which they vote together in favor of 
certain issues or abstain would essentially be the inverse 
of the network shown in Figure 2). The figure also 
shows the results of a community identification 
algorithm [20,21] that we used to identify strong 
coalitions in our voting network. The community 
detection algorithm essentially performs hierarchical 
clustering on the network and identifies sub-groups of 
voters that vote together more frequently than with other 
sub-groups. 
 
 
Figure 2: The Voting Network of the PJM MC. 
 
Our clustering algorithm identified three 
communities in the PJM voting network, represented as 
green, red and yellow nodes and branches in Figure 2. 
As would be expected, the densities of these detected 
communities are individually quite high (between 0.95 
and 0.99). More interesting is the composition of the 
detected communities. One of the communities shown 
in the network in Figure 2 consists primarily of firms 
from the ED and EUC sectors. The other two 
communities are split between the remaining three 
sectors (GO, TO and OS).  
Recall from Section 1 that our semi-structured 
interviews revealed a perception among some 
participants in the PJM stakeholder process that load-
side sectors (ED and EUC) form a strong coalition 
against the passage of some initiatives. The interviews 
also revealed a perception among some stakeholders 
that supply-side sectors (primarily GO and TO) form a 
strong coalition that keeps initiatives from passing. Our 
network analysis of the 26 voting items overall suggests 
that there is some evidence for a strong ED-EUC 
Sector'weighted-voting-example
Sector For Against Abstain Total Total12 Abstain %1in1favor
Transmission1Owner 8 2 4 14 10 0.8
Generation1Owner 15 0 1 16 15 1
Other1Supplier 10 10 5 25 20 0.5
Electric1Distributor 3 7 15 25 10 0.3
End1Use1Customer 12 2 0 14 14 0.857
Total1%1in1favor 3.457
Threshold1=13.335
(2/31of1total1vote,1.6671x151sectors)
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coalition that could stop initiatives from passing either 
through natural alignment or through explicit 
coordination. We find much less evidence from the 
voting network of such a strong coalition among any of 
the other three sectors. Strong coalitions of some voters 
across these three sectors to exist, as shown in Figure 2, 
but because they effectively divide sectors they cannot 
act in the same pivotal way as the ED-EUC coalition. 
 
4. Capacity Market Redesign in PJM  
 
The remainder of our analysis of the PJM 
stakeholder process is focused on a series of six MC 
votes taken on the same day in 2011. Each of these six 
voting items represented a proposed change to the 
structure of PJM’s forward capacity construct, known as 
the Reliability Pricing Model. The proposed RPM 
changes followed the release of the second triennial 
RPM review by the Brattle Group [22]. All six proposals 
concerned the shape of the Variable Resource 
Requirements (VRR) curve, the administrative demand 
curve that PJM uses to determine the clearing point for 
the capacity market. None of the six proposals passed 
the MC with the required threshold voting score of 
3.335 or higher, as shown in Table 3 (the details of each 
proposal are described in Sec. 4.1, below). The failure 
of the MC to pass any of the proposed RPM redesigns 
(including a status-quo proposal under which no 
changes would have been made to the VRR curve) 
triggered an alternative resolution process called the 
Enhanced Liason Committee process, under which 
groups of self-organized stakeholders presented RPM 
redesign alternatives to the PJM Board. 
 
 Table 3: Outcomes of RPM Redesign Votes 
 
 
As can be seen from Table 3, some proposed RPM 
redesigns had fairly broad support among the ED and 
EUC sectors (such as Packages 11, 12 and 13), while 
others had strong opposition from the ED and EUC 
sectors (such as Package 10 and the PJM proposed RPM 
change). The status quo RPM proposal had the lowest 
overall voting score among any of the six RPM voting 
items. 
The failure of the MC to pass any proposed redesign 
to RPM represented the first time that the stakeholder 
process had deadlocked in this way, and in our 
interviews raised concerns among both stakeholder 
participants and PJM staff as to the extent to which 
issues like RPM and resource adequacy more broadly 
could be handled by the current stakeholder voting 
structure. We take advantage of the unique number and 
structure of these votes, combined with our detailed 
voting data and a model of participatory decision-
making to address two key questions relevant to using 
the stakeholder process to ensure reliability. First, we 
parameterize payoff functions for different types of 
firms in the PJM stakeholder process to generate a 
predictive voting model for this series of RPM votes and 
try to identify any change to the VRR curve that would 
have passed through the MC voting process. Second, we 
identify that while in theory the ED-EUC coalition 
described in Sec. 3 could (and sometimes does) behave 
pivotally to keep voting items from passing, in the 
specific case of RPM redesign the pivotal voters were 
more likely to be a smaller number of financial players. 
 
4.1. Modeling the VRR Redesign Proposals 
The six RPM votes on which we focus our analysis 
all concern the shape of the VRR curve, as shown in 
Figure 3. The the VRR curve parameters most salient to 
our analysis include the Gross Cost of New Entry 
(CONE); the CONE net of estimated energy and 
ancillary services payments (referred to as “Net 
CONE”); and the Installed Reserve Margin (IRM), 
which refers to the quantity of capacity needed to meet 
peak demand plus the calculated capacity reserve. 
Under the RPM specifications at the time that the votes 
were taken, the VRR curve is horizontal at a level just 
below Gross CONE until the cleared capacity is a 
certain level below the IRM (point a in Figure 3). The 
Gross CONE thus serves as the price cap in the RPM. 
Between point a and a level of cleared capacity just 
above the IRM, the VRR curve slopes downward until 
it intersects with the Net CONE (point b in Figure 3). At 
higher levels of cleared capacity the VRR curve 
continues to slope downward until the cleared capacity 
reaches several percentage points above IRM (point c in 
Figure 3). Beyond point c, the VRR curve is vertical, 
indicating zero value to additional cleared capacity. 
While the determination of the Gross and Net CONE 
is a complex matter involving the estimation of 
technology costs and market outcomes, the RPM 
redesign proposals considered by the MC in our data set 
ultimately amount to proposals over the level of points 
a and b on the VRR curve. No proposal considered by 
the MC at the time in question would have affected point 
c. Parameterizing the VRR curve proposals considered 
by the MC is relatively straightforward. 
Figure 4 shows the six RPM proposals visually. As 
outlined in Table 3, one proposal represented the status 
quo (no change to the VRR curve); another came as a 
recommendation from PJM staff (referred to in the 
voting data as “package 1”); and four others were 
Item Date Voting,item TO GO EUC ED Other Voting,Score
04b0 10/20/2011 Status,Quo 0.083 0.071 0.083 0.043 0.056 0.336 Failed
04b1 10/20/2011 PJM,Recommendation 0.8 0.833 0 0 0.667 2.3 Failed
04b2 10/20/2011 Package,10 0.75 0.714 0 0 0.323 1.787 Failed
04b3 10/20/2011 Package,11 0.167 0.08 0.909 0.913 0.235 2.301 Failed
04b4 10/20/2011 Package,12 0.167 0.231 1 0.913 0.25 2.561 Failed
04b5 10/20/2011 Package,13 0.333 0.267 1 1 0.513 3.113 Failed
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proposed by various PJM stakeholders. Compared to the 
status quo and other things being held equal, packages 
11, 12, and 13 estimate future demand to be smaller than 
previous predictions leading the capacity price to be 
settled at lower level as compared to the status quo (dark 
blue line in Figure 4). On the other hand, packages 1 and 
10, would have set point 𝑎 vertically above point	𝑏, 
induce the clearing price to be at the price cap even 
when the supply offer is a little less than the target 
margin. This is about 40 percent or more than 60 percent 
increase in the price for package 10 and 1 respectively. 
 
Figure 3: Example VRR Curve. Source: Author 
calculations based on [22] 
 
 
Figure 3: VRR Curves Considered by the MC. 
Source: Author calculations based on [22] 
 
The set of proposed changes to the RPM considered 
by the MC thus consist of three proposals that would 
have lowered capacity prices relative to the status quo; 
two that would have raised capacity prices relative to the 
status quo; and the status quo VRR curve at the time that 
the proposals were voted upon.  
 
5. A Model of Passable Proposals 
 
As discussed in Sec. 3, all six of the proposed RPM 
redesigns failed to pass through the stakeholder process, 
including the status quo VRR curve. To assess the 
existence of any proposed capacity market redesign that 
would have achieved the voting score threshold for 
passage through the MC, we adapt the “acceptable 
proposal” model from the political economy literature 
[15,16] to the structure and participant composition of 
the PJM Members Committee. While the acceptable 
proposal framework models consensus decisions, it is 
easily adaptable to the type of super-majority voting 
framework of the MC. To avoid confusion with 
consensus decision-making we thus refer to our 
framework as one to assess the existence of “passable 
proposals.” 
Suppose there are n relevant policy parameters X = 
(x1,…,xn) (here X represents the status quo); m 
individuals and their utility functions 𝑈3 =𝑈3(𝑥-, 	 ⋯ , 𝑥&) where 𝑖 = 1, 	 ⋯ , 	𝑚; a proposal 𝒚 =𝑑𝑥-, 	 ⋯ , 𝑑𝑥& . If a proposal is acceptable for 
individual i, then it needs to satisfy: 
 
* * *
1 2
1 2
0
i i i
n
n
U U Udx dx dx
x x x
+ + + >
   
(1)   
 
 
Equation (1) represents increase in utility of 
individual 𝑖 with the implementation of the proposal y* 
= (dx1*,…,dxn*). We assume that the payoff function of 
the i-th voter is proportional to her utility function, with 
li the constant of proportionality. Consensus in this 
framework is defined as the payoff function condition 
Ay > 0, where 
 
(2) 
1 1
1 1
1
1
n
m m
n n
n
U U
x x
A
U U
x x
=
,
1
2
n
y
y
y
y
=
 0i >  
 
Recall that a passable proposal in the PJM MC is one 
that can achieve an overall voting score of 3.335 or 
higher. We adapt the framework in equations (1) and (2) 
by defining 𝒁 as a set of firm𝑠	that satisfies equation (2) 
and would thus vote yes on the proposal.Then a 
complement of	𝒁,	𝒁𝒄, is a set of firms that will vote no.  
Passage of a voting item in the PJM stakeholder 
framework needs 𝑤33∈𝒁 > 3.335 where 𝑤3	is	the 
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sector-weight of a firm	𝑖. In other words, blockage of an 
issue requires 𝑤33∈𝒁𝒄 > 1.665. 
If firm-level utility functions can be sufficiently 
parameterized, we can use the framework in equations 
(1) and (2) to develop a predictive model of stakeholder 
voting, and can apply this model to the series of RPM 
votes faced by the PJM Members Committee in 2011. 
 
5.1. Parameterizing Payoff Functions 
 
We use our parameterization of the capacity market 
proposals as specifying the shape of the VRR curve 
(points a and b in Figures 3 and 4), combined with some 
information on the composition of participants in the 
PJM Members Committee, to parameterize utility 
functions for different types of firms. 
 
 
Figure 5: RPM Price Sensitivity to a Deviation 
of a% From the IRM Target. 
 
For the purposes of this discussion, we assume that 
there are five types of players in the PJM Members 
Committee, corresponding to the five sectoral 
definitions in the PJM stakeholder process (see also Sec. 
2). This assumption will be relaxed somewhat below 
and is the topic of ongoing research. We also assume 
that firm-level utility can be represented by a payoff 
function dependent only on capacity market outcomes. 
In other words, we assume that payoffs from the 
capacity market are separable from payoffs in (for 
example) the energy and ancillary services markets, and 
firms thus vote for or against capacity market redesign 
proposals based solely on how each proposal would 
affect capacity market outcomes and not outcomes in 
other PJM markets. This may well be a strong 
assumption and is an area for future model refinement. 
We assume that there are five types of players in the 
PJM stakeholder process, corresponding to the five 
stakeholder sectors: generation owner (GO), 
transmission owner (TO), electric distributor (ED) and 
end use customer (EUC) and other supplier (OS). We 
assume that all players within a single type are 
homogenous, although we will start to relax this 
assumption later in the paper and can relax it even 
further in future work. We assume that GO payoffs are 
directly proportional to capacity prices, while payoffs 
for ED and EUC are inversely proportional. Capacity 
payments are assumed to be made directly from ED 
firms and indirectly from EUC firms, so we set a share 
of the total capacity payment burden for ED firms as q 
and the payment burden equal to (1- q), q is between 0 
and 1.  
The form of the payoff function for GO, ED and 
EUC firms will depend on whether the proposal point y 
being considered lies to the left or right of point b on the 
VRR curve, as shown in Figure 5. We illustrate these 
payoff functions assuming that the clearing quantity is 
below the IRM by a percent. In this case, the payoff 
functions for the GO, ED and EUC type players can be 
written as: 
 
(3) 𝜋IJ 𝑃L, 𝑄, 𝐶 = 𝑃L − 𝐶 ×𝑄L + 𝑏 + 𝛼× 𝑎 − 𝑏4 ×𝑄T 𝜋UV 𝑃WXYTXY, 𝑄 = 𝑃WXYTXY×𝑄L − 𝜃 𝑏 + 𝛼× (𝑎 − 𝑏)4 ×𝑄T 
 𝜋U[\ 𝑃TXY, 𝑄 = −𝑃TXY×𝑄L − (1− 𝜃) 𝑏 + 𝛼× (𝑎 − 𝑏)4 ×𝑄T 
 
where PW is the clearing price in the wholesale market, 
C is the marginal cost of generation, PNetRet is the retail 
rate net of transmission charges and wholesale costs, PR 
is the gross retail rate, Q is the wholesale clearing 
quantity, QW is the cleared quantity in the wholesale 
market, QR is the cleared quantity in the capacity market 
and q is the ED’s share of capacity costs as described 
above. 
Modeling the payoff function for the TO sector is 
somewhat more complex, since a firm owning no assets 
other than transmission would neither benefit nor be 
harmed by higher or lower capacity prices. We note 
from our data, however, that all but one of the firms in 
the TO sector are investor owned utilities with 
generation assets and load serving obligations; many 
voted for those capacity market proposals that would 
have tended to increase the capacity price. We 
parameterize the payoff function for the TO sector as 
being composed of a weighted sum of payoffs from the 
generation, transmission and load serving business 
functions: 
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(4) 𝜋]J 𝑃 , 𝑃], 𝑃WXYTXY𝐶, 𝑄L, 𝑄T = 𝛾- 𝑃 − 𝐶 ×𝑄 + (𝑏 + 𝛼× ('`a )×𝑄T + 𝛾b 𝑃]×𝑄 + 𝛾c 𝑃WXYTXY	×𝑄 − 𝜃×(𝑏 + 𝛼× ('`a )×𝑄T  
 
In equation (4), 𝛾3 is a share of asset 𝑖, where 0 <𝛾3 < 1, 𝑖 = 1, 2, 3 (generation, transmission, load 
server respectively) and 𝛾- + 𝛾b + 𝛾c = 1. PT 
represents the transmission fee. 
From (4), we calculate marginal payoffs for this 
sector as: 
 
(5) 𝜕𝜋𝜕𝑎 = 𝛼4 𝑄T 𝛾- − 𝜃𝛾c  
 𝜕𝜋𝜕𝑏 = 1 − 𝛼4 𝑄T(𝛾- − 𝜃𝛾c) 
 
From (5), note in particular that payoffs for the TO 
sector do not depend on the share of its business in the 
transmission sector (g2). Whether payoffs increase or 
decrease with marginally higher values of a and b in (5) 
depends on the quantity γ- − 𝜃γc. Our model thus 
predicts that firms in the TO sector with large quantities 
of generation would vote in favor of proposals that 
would tend to increase capacity prices. 
 Parameterizing the payoff functions for the OS 
sector is also difficult, since that sector is highly 
heterogeneous, consisting of curtailment service 
providers, marketers, municipal and cooperative 
utilities, other transmission-dependent utilities, and 
purely financial players (such as banks and hedge funds 
that participate in PJM primarily via virtual bidding). 
We observe in our data that curtailment service 
providers vote with generation owners in support of 
capacity market proposals that would, other things being 
equal, lead to higher capacity clearing prices. 
Municipal, cooperative, and transmission-dependent 
utilities with generation holdings also tended to vote in 
alignment with the GO sector. Marketers and financial 
players are the most difficult to model, so we will treat 
these participants as “undecided” or swing voters in our 
model. 
 
6. The Geometry of Capacity Market 
Voting 
 
We are now in a position to integrate the theory of 
passable proposals in the PJM stakeholder process 
(equations 1 and 2) with our parameterization of the 
proposed changes to the RPM and the payoff functions 
of different voter types (equations 3 through 5) to 
identify conditions under which a proposal for reform to 
the VRR curve would be passable. As we will see, the 
existence of a passable proposal depends on both the 
proposal characteristics (points a and b) and the voting 
patterns of the OS sector. 
Let M be a matrix consisting of rows of Ay 
satisfying: 
 
(6) 𝑴𝒚 = 𝑚3,( 𝑚3,` 𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑏 > 0 
 
where mi,a and mi,b represent the marginal payoff to 
player i from a change in a and b, respectively. Inserting 
equations (3) – (5) into equations (1) and (2), the 
conditions for acceptability are given by: 
(7) 
 
𝑨𝒚 =
𝜆IJ 𝜕𝑈IJ𝜕𝑎 𝜆IJ 𝜕𝑈IJ𝜕𝑏𝜆UV 𝜕𝑈UV𝜕𝑎 𝜆UV 𝜕𝑈UV𝜕𝑏𝜆U[\ 𝜕𝑈U[\𝜕𝑎 𝜆U\[ 𝜕𝑈U[\𝜕𝑏𝜆]J 𝜕𝑈]J𝜕𝑎 𝜆]J 𝜕𝑈]J𝜕𝑏𝜆\lm 𝜕𝑈\lm𝜕𝑎 𝜆\lm 𝜕𝑈\lm𝜕𝑏𝜆Jl 𝜕𝑈Jl𝜕𝑎 𝜆Jl 𝜕𝑈Jl𝜕𝑏
𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑏  
 
= na 𝑄T 1 − na 𝑄T−𝜃 na 𝑄T −𝜃 1 − na 𝑄T−(1 − 𝜃) na 𝑄T −(1 − 𝜃) 1 − na 𝑄Tna (𝛾- − 𝜃𝛾c)𝑄T 1 − na (𝛾- − 𝜃𝛾c)𝑄Tna 𝑄T 1 − na 𝑄Topqro( opqro`
𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑏  
 
Note that in the system of equations (7), we have 
purposefully left the derivatives o[qro(  and o[qro`  
ambiguous for players in the OS sector whose incentives 
are difficult to identify based on player characteristics 
or voting records. 
The size of the matrix	𝑴 (i.e,. the number of TO 
players who would find a given RPM design proposal 
acceptable). depends on the sign of	𝛾- − 𝜃𝛾c. This is 
because TO profits differ according to the the 
importance of the generation versus load serving side of 
the business, as shown in equation (4).  
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Consider the acceptability criterion for TO when the 
capacity market clears at a level lower than the target 
IRM:  
 
(7)  
 (𝛾- − 𝜃𝛾c) 𝛼4 𝑄T×𝑑𝑎 + 1 − 𝛼4 𝑄T×𝑑𝑏  
  
If 𝛾- − 𝜃𝛾c > 0, then we have: 
 
(8)  
 𝛼4 𝑄T×𝑑𝑎 + 1 − 𝛼4 𝑄T×𝑑𝑏 > 0 ⇒ 𝑑𝑏 > − 𝛼4 − 𝛼 ×𝑑𝑎 
  
and the TO firm would be predicted to vote in alignment 
with the GO sector. If 𝛾- − 𝜃𝛾c < 0 we would then 
have	𝑑𝑏 < − na'n ×𝑑𝑎 and the TO firm would be 
predicted to vote in alignment with the ED and EUC 
sector.  
Assuming that CSPs have payoff functions 
equivalent to those of the GO sector, we can draw the 
payoff functions in the space of modifications to the 
capacity market  as shown in Figure 6. Since the payoffs 
are non-overlapping, whether a given proposal passes or 
not would depend on the number of undecided 
stakeholders that could be convinced to vote for or 
against it. 
 
 
Figure 6: The space of possible modifications 
to the capacity market. 
 
By way of illustration, suppose that a proposal is 
represented by one of the arrows in Figure 7. It would 
thus be acceptable to the GO sector, CSPs and those TOs 
for which 𝛾- − 𝜃𝛾c > 0. We would then have: 
 
(9) 
 𝑴𝒚 = 𝑚IJ,( 𝑚IJ,`𝑚]J,(t 𝑚]J,`t𝑚\lm,( 𝑚\lm,( 𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑏  
=
𝛼4 𝑄T 1 − 𝛼4 𝑄T𝛼4 (𝛾- − 𝜃𝛾c)𝑄T 1 − 𝛼4 (𝛾- − 𝜃𝛾c)𝑄T𝛼4 𝑄T 1 − 𝛼4 𝑄T
𝑑𝑎𝑑𝑏 > 0 
 
Figure 7: Representation of proposals in 
stakeholder preference space. 
 
Whether such a proposal would pass can be 
evaluated by looking at the sector-weighted voting share 
contributed by those stakeholders that would vote for it, 
those that would vote against, and those that are 
undecided and act as swing voters. 
 
6.1. Application from the RPM Voting Data 
Set 
The geometry of voting in the case of the RPM 
redesign proposals and the influence of “undecided” 
voters can be illustrated with two examples, taken from 
a proposal that would have increased the capacity 
clearing price, other things being equal, relative to the 
status quo. We will evaluate this proposal using the 
coalition model developed in this paper to predict how 
firms would vote, and then using the actual voting data. 
In the language of Section 5, Figure 7 suggests that 
we would have 𝒁 = 𝐺𝑂, 𝑇𝑂-, 𝐶𝑆𝑃 , 𝒁𝒄 =𝐸𝐷, 𝐸𝑈𝐶, 𝑇𝑂b , 𝐔𝒄 = 𝑂𝑆  (where OS excludes the 
CSPs and other firms with alignment with other sectors). 
Using the mechanism of sector-weighted voting 
employed in PJM, if voters in coalition Z vote in favor, 
the voters in coalition Zc vote in opposition, we would 
have 𝑤33∈𝒁 = 1.95, 𝑤33∈𝒁𝒄 = 2.25, and		𝑤Jl =0.8. Thus, under PJM rules, our model predicts that 
either coalition Z or Zc could have blocked the proposal 
from passing. Since Zc consists primarily of the ED and 
EUC sector, this illustration suggests that a demand-side 
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coalition could theoretically block any capacity market 
redesign proposal that would tend to increase the 
capacity clearing price. 
In practice, however, we observe some deviations 
from our voting model. Some firms in the GO sector, for 
example, voted against capacity market proposals that 
would have tended to raise capacity clearing prices 
relative to the status quo. Some firms in the ED and EUC 
sectors voted for such proposals. Based on observed 
voting behavior, we have 𝑤33∈𝒁 = 1.658, 𝑤33∈𝒁𝒄 =2.52, and	𝑤Jl = 0.822. 
The role of the undecided or swing voters from the 
OS sector is more clear in practice than in theory. Under 
PJM sector-weighted voting rules, coalition Zc needed 
only two votes from the undecided OS sector in order to 
ensure failure of the capacity market proposal (recall 
that a coalition can prevent a proposal from passing with 
a total voting score of 1.655 or greater). Recall that the 
undecided OS sector consists primarily of firms that do 
not take physical positions in the market (such as 
marketers, banks and hedge funds) and as such do not 
have any apparent stake in capacity market outcomes. It 
is not immediately clear why these firms in the OS 
sector are voting for or against the various capacity 
market redesign proposals. These firms may have other 
business units that do have a stake in physical market 
outcomes (for example, banks may be involved in 
project finance) or they may be engaged in coalition-
building that spans votes on multiple issue types [23]. 
 
7. Conclusions and Future Work 
Regional Transmission Organizations are critical 
organizations for ensuring reliability and facilitating the 
integration of new technology in the U.S. electric power 
grid. The rules and protocols that influence the value of 
new technology and the cost of achieving reliable 
operations are not created in a vacuum, but are rather the 
result of a stakeholder-driven process that we argue can 
be modeled in a systematic way. We have illustrated two 
potential ways in which formal models of the 
stakeholder process could be utilized – to verify 
stakeholder perceptions of power in the stakeholder 
process, and to address the increasingly relevant 
question of whether electricity market rules can be 
successfully designed directly by the players in those 
markets. We draw three conclusions from this work. 
First, we do find evidence in a broad set of voting 
data that end-use interests (the ED and EUC sectors) do 
form a strong coalition that can and does act to strike 
down proposals before the MC. This is consistent with 
the perceptions viewed by some stakeholders in our 
semi-structured interviews. We do not find evidence of 
a similarly strong coalition among supplier-side 
interests. 
Second, our application of the passable-proposal 
model to the capacity market shows how in theory either 
a coalition of end-use sectors and some transmission 
owners, or a coalition of supply-side participants and 
other transmission owners could keep any capacity 
market redesign proposal from passing. This theoretical 
finding suggests that there may be limits to the degree 
to which organizations like RTOs can create 
mechanisms for heterogeneous stakeholders with 
opposing interests to develop passable market rules and 
protocols. 
Third, the reality of voting in the capacity market 
redesign case suggests that the formation of such 
“pivotal coalitions” is more complex than our model of 
passable proposals would suggest. While in theory 
clean-cut coalitions of end-use or supply-side interest 
could act to keep capacity market redesign proposals 
from passing, in practice the formation of these 
coalitions depends on convincing a small number of 
swing players to vote in alignment with the coalition. 
These swing players, primarily marketers and financial 
firms, represent the pivotal voters in the capacity market 
redesign case. Identifying the types of pivotal voters or 
coalitions for other voting issues is a topic of ongoing 
research. 
Our analysis suggests that market-driven constructs 
to ensure resource adequacy may not be amenable to 
design by the type of stakeholder-driven processes 
currently in place in PJM. Given the controversy over 
capacity market constructs and the financial stakes, this 
is perhaps not surprising.  
The history of difficulty in making changes to the 
RPM design was the justification for the use of an 
alternative mechanism for the construction of PJM’s 
recent capacity performance rules [24]. Under this 
alternative mechanism, known as the Enhanced Liason 
Committee (ELC), stakeholders participate in the policy 
formation process but not through voting. Coalitions of 
stakeholders are self-organized, rather than stakeholders 
being associated with one of the five industry sectors 
described in this paper (a choice which, as discussed, 
affects the voting power of each stakeholder). In the 
capacity performance mechanism design process, nearly 
a dozen coalitions emerged from the PJM stakeholder 
group. Each coalition produced a position paper, and the 
PJM Board ultimately made the decision on which 
proposal to support and file with the FERC. 
From an organizational theory standpoint, the ELC 
process actually has some advantages to the more 
structured stakeholder voting procedure. Because of its 
mission to make decisions in a stakeholder-driven way, 
RTOs share many commonalities with “boundary 
organizations,” described in the organizational theory 
literature [25] as those who need to reconcile diverse 
and conflicting interests. The ELC represents a step 
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towards PJM acting as this type of organization by 
disrupting the type of power balance observed in our 
analysis and allowing coalitions to emerge rather than 
be defined by sectoral affiliation. While the outcome is 
not guaranteed to be one that is universally accepted, 
PJM should consider expanding its use by identifying 
issue types where the traditional stakeholder process is 
likely to deadlock and invoking the ELC (or something 
like it) in its place. 
As a mechanism for identifying these types of 
controversial issues, the approach used in this paper has 
some potential but additional work is needed to identify 
drivers behind deviations from coalition voting, which 
we observed in our capacity market analysis. Additional 
future work involves comparisons between PJM and 
other Regional Transmission Organizations. Since we 
find some evidence suggestive of dynamic interplay 
between stakeholders, particularly between traditional 
players in the physical market and what appear to be 
purely or primarily financial players, another area of 
future work involves using a more dynamic or game-
theoretic framework to model the repeated interactions 
of participants in the PJM stakeholder process. 
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